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June 7, 2017

To whom it may concern:

Company Name:	Kuroda Electric Co., Ltd.
Name of Representative:	Koichi Hosokawa, President
(Securities Code:	7517 First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange
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### **Background of how the Company’s Board of Directors formulated its opinions against Shareholder’s Proposal**

Kuroda Electric Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “the Company”) had received a shareholder’s proposal from a large shareholder of the Company, Reno, Inc. (of which the head office is located in Shibuya-ku, Tokyo and President and Representative Director is Hironao Fukushima; hereinafter referred to as “the Requesting Shareholder”) for the 82nd ordinary general meeting of shareholders scheduled to be held on June 29, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as “the General Meeting”), and the Company resolved upon objection to the proposal at the meeting of the Board of Directors held on May 23, 2017.

Details of the reasons why the Board of Directors of the Company objected the proposal are stated in “Notice of Opinions of the Company’s Board of Directors on Shareholder’s Proposal” dated May 29, 2017. The Company made judgement that it is important to provide shareholders with information related to the details of events and dialogues between the Requesting Shareholder and the Company in connection with holding the General Meeting. Therefore, the details shall be shown as follows:

The Company hereby sincerely asks shareholders to make considerable judgement on exercising voting rights at the General Meeting upon understanding information stated below.

#### **PARTICULARS**

##### **1. Background of how the Shareholder’s Proposal formulated**

###### **(1) About the Requesting Shareholder**

The Requesting Shareholder is “Reno, Inc.” Reno, Inc. is a shareholder of the Company and submitted Large-Volume Holdings Reports under five joint names as of March 29, 2017. According to such reports in the past, the Requesting Shareholder belongs to the same group as “C&I Holdings Co., Ltd.” which requested to convene an extraordinary general meeting of shareholders of the Company in 2015. Although the names of the joint holders have changed several times, it is apparent that the persons substantially

control the group are Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami residing in Republic of Singapore (who was rendered guilty judgement in 2011 against violation of the Securities and Exchange Law committed by insider-trading of listed shares (Note 1)) and Ms. Aya Nomura (formerly Ms. Aya Murakami) who is a relative in the first degree of Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami. In fact, in the meeting held on April 21, 2017 upon a request of the Requesting Shareholder, Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami, claiming that he is a large shareholder of Office Support Corporation which is one of the joint holders of the Requesting Shareholder (Note 2), also attended the meeting in addition to Mr. Hironao Fukushima who is a representative of Reno, Inc. and the President and Representative Executive Officer of the Company. In the meeting, Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami made statements repeatedly as if he drafted the shareholder's proposal and were a representative of the Requesting Shareholder, and such statements and actions of Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami practically demonstrated the circumstances where he substantially controls the group including the Requesting Shareholder.

(Note 1) On June 6, 2011, a judgement of the Tokyo High Court finally and conclusively determined upon dismissal of re-appeal by the Supreme Court ordering two year penal servitude, with three year suspension of execution of penalties, with a fine of 3 million yen, and additional charge of approximately 1,149 million yen.

(Note 2) Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami is a relative of Ms. Aya Nomura (formerly Ms. Aya Murakami) who is a representative director of "C&I Holdings Co., Ltd." at the time when C&I Holdings Co., Ltd. requested to convene an extraordinary general meeting of shareholders of the Company in 2015 and one of the joint holders on a Large-Volume Holdings Report submitted by Reno, Inc. dated March 29, 2017. In addition, he explained to the Company that he is a large shareholder of Office Support Corporation which jointly holds shares of the Company.

In the light of the contents of the meeting on April 21, 2017 with Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami, the Company believes, for its accountability to general minority shareholders and all other stakeholders, that it is necessary to clarify the actual state of the Requesting Shareholder and the joint holders.

Information stated in Appendix 1 is what the Company confirmed based on the Large-Volume Holdings Reports and change-of-status reports filed by the Requesting Shareholder. In detail, we do not know what Reno, Inc. is and what Office Support Corporation holding jointly shares of the Company is. Furthermore, as we concern about the purpose of holding shares and the source of funds and the like of the individual joint shareholder who quickly purchased shares of the Company by margin trading, we requested the representative of the Requesting Shareholder to provide the Company with information. Such request includes the request for provision of information with respect to three juridical persons which were joint holders with the Requesting Shareholder in the past (indicating C&I Holdings Co., Ltd., Minami Aoyama Fudosan Co., Ltd. and City Index Maiko Co., Ltd.)

- (2) First Request from the Requesting Shareholder – Receipt of document entitled "Correspondence" dated March 29, 2017

The Company has made efforts to disclose sufficient information to all shareholders including the Requesting Shareholder and strengthen IR activities to "facilitate constructive dialogues" as stated in the corporate governance code on a regular basis so that the Company has tried to sufficiently communicate

with the Requesting Shareholder. When the Requesting Shareholder made questions on the contents of the quarterly report filed by the Company, the Company sincerely explained the business circumstances and the like as well as the direction the Company pursues. The Company recognized the Requesting Shareholder has understood the targeted direction and management policy through such “constructive dialogues with shareholders”. However, the Company suddenly received the following requests in the document entitled “Correspondence” dated March 29, 2017.

**【Requested items stated in the document entitled “Correspondence” dated March 29, 2017】**

- ( i ) In order for the Company to expand the sales revenue to levels comparable to overseas electronic components trading companies, which are called Mega-Distributors, and to pursue growth through the use of economy of scale and management resources, if the Requesting Shareholder makes a proposal of management integration (business merger) with a company expected to generate synergy through the management integration (business merger), the Company should sincerely examine.
- ( ii ) For the purpose of executing management integration (business merger) steadily with a company proposed by the Requesting Shareholder, the Requesting Shareholder has intention to recommend a few candidates for Outside Directors and the Company should examine to add them as candidates for Outside Directors as a form of Company’s proposal.

While the Company has intention to sincerely examine proposals made by shareholders, we believe that increasing sustainable corporate value facilitates the enhancement of common interest of all shareholders including large shareholders. Therefore, the Requesting Shareholder’s sudden and unilateral requests are inharmonious with the Company. If the requests “electing candidates for Outside Directors for the purpose of executing management integration (business merger) steadily” are “the Requesting Shareholder’s own intention”, i.e., if the proposal were for the purpose of materializing the special intention of the specific large shareholder, the acceptance thereof would provide the large shareholder with arbitrary opportunity so that other general minority shareholders’ interests would be threatened to be substantially damaged.

Therefore, the Company determined that we have to confirm the true intention of the Requesting Shareholder first and foremost, and made responses on April 7, 2017 to the Requesting Shareholder stating ( i ) the Company shall sincerely examine whether or not the Requesting Shareholder’s request facilitates the enhancement of corporate value of the Company; and ( ii ) the Company has made efforts to have constructive dialogues with shareholders and investors to materialize sustainable development, and various opinions obtained through such dialogues shall be referred to for business management, and the Company asks the true intention of the Requesting Shareholder.

- (3) List of Candidates for Outside Directors – Receipt of document entitled “List of Candidates for Outside Directors” dated April 11, 2017 and Thereafter

Thereafter, the Requesting Shareholder only submitted the document entitled “List of Candidates for Outside Directors” (hereinafter, referred to as “the List”) dated April 11, 2017 not in the form of execution of shareholder’s proposal based on the Companies Act. The List states six individuals in total and it included two individuals and three individuals shown in Appendix 2 hereto, other than Mr. Shin

Yasunobe (hereinafter, referred to as “Mr. Yasunobe”), a candidate for Outside Director the Requesting Shareholder proposed in the form of the shareholder’s proposal for the General Meeting .

It has been confirmed that two candidates for Outside Directors (Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami and Mr. Hironao Fukushima) described on the List are identical to candidates for Outside Directors proposed by C&I Holdings Co., Ltd. at the Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders of the Company on August 21, 2015 which was held upon a request from C&I Holdings Co., Ltd. to convene the extraordinary general meeting of shareholders (hereinafter referred to as “the 2015 Extraordinary General Meeting”).

At the 2015 Extraordinary General Meeting, the Board of Directors of the Company expressed objection statement against the shareholder’s proposal to elect four Outside Directors including these two individuals submitted by C&I Holdings Co., Ltd. for the reason that it might only represent the specific shareholder’s interest so that it might threaten to substantially damage long-term common interest of shareholders of the Company and distort the appropriate corporate governance of the Company and the like. At that time, the objection statement was well accepted by shareholders so as to negate the shareholder’s proposal to elect four Outside Directors including aforesaid two individuals.

It was not clear whether or not four Outside Directors other than Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami and Mr. Hironao Fukushima on the List have submitted acceptance of assumption of offices. In addition, while “a lawyer specialized in M&A” was also nominated, any specific name was disclosed and there was only a statement that “a lawyer specialized in M&A would be selected for the purpose of promoting the M&A strategy hereafter”. From this standpoint, it was presumed that the Requesting Shareholder tentatively intended to select “a person promoting the management integration (business merger)” in compliance with the Requesting Shareholder’s intension. Furthermore, when Mr. Hironao Fukushima, a representative of the Requesting Shareholder, explained to the Company a purport of the List, he spoke in the careless way so that it became questionable how seriously and sincerely the List has been prepared.

Given such circumstances, the Company became to believe the Requesting Shareholder’s proposing stance of the List is substantially questionable.

Furthermore, for a while, the Requesting Shareholder strongly repeated statement that he would be able to affect substantially the management system of the Company on the assumption that its shareholding ratio has reached to a certain level. The Requesting Shareholder also continued demanding to submit the candidates for Outside Directors described in the List as the Company’s proposal to the General Meeting.

On the basis of the Requesting Shareholder’s stances, the Company confirmed it necessary to examine the Requesting Shareholder’s requests in a specifically careful manner and repeated discussions inside, because if the requests were accepted, it would not be harmonious with the customary idea of the Company that sustainable increase of corporate value only facilitates enhancement of common interest of all shareholders including large shareholders, and might generate a significant adverse effect on general minority shareholders of the Company.

(4) Repeated Request for the Company’s proposal and Meeting on April 21, 2017 with Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami

Thereafter, the Requesting Shareholder, almost every day and sometimes multiple times a day, inquired by e-mails and telephones the result and development of examination on whether or not the

Requesting Shareholder's proposal on the candidates for Outside Directors converted to the Company's proposal for the General Meeting.

At the meeting on April 21, 2017 which Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami attended, Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami stressed "the need for pushing ahead management integration (business merger)" to realize "the expansion of the sales revenue" or "the pursuit of economy of scale", and made remarks repeatedly as if only the Requesting Shareholder and the joint holders could make final decision on important matters and events of management judgement affecting the future direction of the Company. At the meeting, the Requesting Shareholder and Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami again requested that "the Company should accept the Requesting Shareholder's proposal and add such candidates for Outside Directors proposed by the Company". Furthermore, Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami kept speaking, and repeatedly interrupted the Company's explanations on the management policy for the future and responses to the Requesting Shareholder, and sometimes showed the cohesive attitude against the management of the Company who attended at the meeting.

The Company recognizes that such manner of contact and their stance of dialogue with the Company were coercive in excess of normal dialogues and problematic from the viewpoint of standard dialogue truly required in the capital market.

Furthermore, on April 28, 2017, a meeting was held between the Requesting Shareholder, Ms. Aya Nomura (formerly Ms. Aya Murakami) jointly holding the Company's share, and the Company. The Requesting Shareholder again emphasized "the need for pushing ahead management integration (business merger)" to realize "the expansion of the sales revenue" or "the pursuit of economy of scale"

The Company examined and considered various choices in response to changes in recent customers' need and diversification as represented in the "New Medium-term Management Plan" announced on May 26, 2017; the Company believes it is prerequisite to increase Operating Profit by increasing Operating Profit Margin focusing on the improvement of the existing business model and creation of new business for next three years. Therefore, it can be said that there is a significant difference in the attitude toward the business between the Requesting Shareholder and the Company, and the Company made a careful decision to such requests and has repeatedly explained the Requesting Shareholder that such requests are quite different from the direction the Company aims.

Upon understanding the current business environment and management duties clearly, the Company demonstrated the future direction of the Company with the concrete size of business upon examination of enhancement of corporate value. If Outside Directors entrusted by a large shareholder who intend to promote the completely different direction of the Company act beyond supervisory function, it might result in not discharging the management policy and the conflict of interest to general minority shareholders so that the Company's sustainable enhancement of corporate value might be impaired.

Through meetings over several times, on May 2, 2017 the Requesting Shareholder finally submitted a "Shareholder's Proposal", and proposed Mr. Yasunobe as a candidate for Outside Director in the form of shareholder's proposal.

Nevertheless, the Requesting Shareholder, almost every day following the aforesaid date, asked the Company to present a proposal to the General Meeting stating "Mr. Yasunobe should be a candidate for Outside Director proposed by the Company". The above request continued until the date on which the Company determined objection to the shareholder's proposal.

(5) Mr. Yasunobe, Candidate for Outside Director proposed by the Requesting Shareholder

As stated above, the Company sincerely continued dialogues with the Requesting Shareholder prior to, and after, the shareholder's proposal based on the Companies Act. In line therefor, the Company's Nominating Committee meetings was held four times during the period from April 21, 2017 to May 23, 2017. The Board of Directors of the Company was held plural times and seriously discussed and examined the necessity and appropriateness with respect to having Mr. Yasunobe to be a candidate for Outside Director of the Company on the basis of discussions among the Nominating Committee meetings.

Upon such examinations and discussions, the Company reviewed the monitoring system by Outside Directors of the Company and considered the necessity to increase the number of Outside Director. The information relating to the carrier and business experience, etc. of Mr. Yasunobe was collected and his intension was confirmed through a meeting with Mr. Yasunobe.

A part of items and events obtained and confirmed in the course of due diligence includes following facts disclosed in the documents of WOODLAND Co. Ltd (hereinafter referred to as "WOODLAND") which was a listed company and of which Mr. Yasunobe assumed office as a Representative Director

- ( i ) As at March 31, 2006, so called "Murakami Fund" where Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami served as a representative was a large shareholder holding 33.99% of shares of WOODLAND of which Mr. Yasunobe was the Representative Director since April 2003 (according to the Securities Report for the 31st Fiscal Year of WOODLAND)
- ( ii ) As at March 31, 2006, Mr. Yasunobe held 6.42% of shares and together with Murakami Fund, held more than 40% of shares of WOODLAND.
- ( iii ) During Mr. Yasunobe's service as a Representative Director of WOODLAND, WOODLAND acquired from another shareholder 28.30% of shares of Associant Technology Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Associant Technology") (Note 3) of which 23.18% shares were held by Murakami Fund, and had Associant Technology an affiliate company as at March 31, 2005.
- ( iv ) After approximately half a year on September 22, 2005, WOODLAND determined to acquire 100% of shares of Associant Technology by way of share exchange so that WOODLAND executed a M&A transaction targeting Associant Technology which Murakami Fund invested in. (As a result, shares of WOODLAND of which Representative Director was Mr. Yasunobe were delivered to Murakami Fund for consideration of the M&A transaction.)

(Note 3) Associant Technology was delisted due to accounting issue on January 2, 2005. It is confirmed that Murakami Fund purchased a large number of shares, more than 23 %, of Associant Technology in stock markets during a very short period (approximately one and a half month) just after the publication of information relating the accounting issue of Associant Technology to the date of delisting (reference to be made to a Large-Volume Holdings Report dated August 8, 2006 of MAC Asset Management, its reporting obligation arose December 30, 2004).

The conditions of each of WOODLAND and Associant Technology before share exchange are referred to the press release dated September 22, 2005 submitted by WOODLAND ("Notice of 100% owned subsidiary by way of share exchange"). On the basis of the press release, it was

confirmed that Murakami Fund was a shareholder holding 17.50% of shares of WOODLAND of which Mr. Yasunobe was Representative Director and 23.18% of shares of Associant Technology. Furthermore, according to the Securities Report for the 31st Fiscal Year of WOODLAND, it was confirmed that Murakami Fund held 33.99% of shares of WOODLAND of which Mr. Yasunobe was Representative Director as at March 31, 2006.

From the aforementioned fact obtained and confirmed through the investigation of the Company, the Company believes that Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami related to the Requesting Shareholder was deemed to have certain influence on business execution by Mr. Yasunobe in the management of WOODLAND of which Mr. Yasunobe was Representative Director. Furthermore, it is strongly assumed that Mr. Yasunobe and Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami had very tight relationship in connection with the M&A transaction involving the companies related to Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami such as the said buyout of Associant Technology.

Taking into consideration the aforesaid aspects and causes, we can substantially presume the background and reasons why Mr. Yasunobe was designated a candidate for Outside Director by the Requesting Shareholder; it is deemed that the Requesting Shareholder considered Mr. Yasunobe was an appropriate person as he could actually represent the Requesting Shareholder's interest as a candidate for Outside Director for the purpose of executing management integration (business merger) steadily with a company proposed by the Requesting Shareholder as proposed in the requesting document dated March 29, 2017 by the Requesting Shareholder.

## 2. Judgement of the Board of Directors and the Nominating Committee of the Company and Evaluation of the Requesting Shareholder's Proposal

In line with the above events and dialogues, the Company repeated discussions with respect to appropriateness on the Requesting Shareholder's proposal at the Board of Directors and the Nominating Committee and conducted a meeting with Mr. Yasunobe so that the Company sincerely continued examinations of the details of the Requesting Shareholder's proposal.

Upon taking into account of the examination results of the Nominating Committee, the Board of Directors of the Company reached the conclusion that the Company objected to the shareholder's proposal made by the Requesting Shareholder for the reason that the additional election of Mr. Yasunobe nominated by the Requesting Shareholder as a candidate for Outside Director of the Company will not bring merits to the shareholders of the Company as stated in the "Notice of Opinions of the Company's Board of Directors on Shareholder's Proposal" dated May 29, 2017.

One of the reasons for objection lies in the Requesting Shareholder's primary proposal, that is, "the need for pushing ahead management integration (business merger)". It will cause the possibility that situation where an Outside Director is strongly affected by a specific shareholder (including shareholders who jointly holds the share of the Company) would continue and thus it is determined the risk is extremely high where the interest of general minority shareholders cannot be properly secured while it is a fundamental essence of the corporate governance.

If the request "electing a candidate for Outside Director for the purpose of executing management integration (business merger) steadily" is "the Requesting Shareholder's own intention", i.e., if the proposal were for the purpose of materializing the special intention of the specific large shareholder, the acceptance

thereof would provide the Requesting Shareholder of which the leader is Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami and its group with arbitrary opportunity so that other general minority shareholders' interests would be threatened to be substantially damaged.

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### Appendix 1

(Table 1) Summary of Your Group's Members and Holding Ratios of Share Certificates, Etc., Stated on Large-Volume Holdings Reports

Names of Submitter and Joint Holders	Nature of Business (In cases of juridical persons)	Representative	Number of Share Certificates, Etc., Held (Total number)	Holding Ratio
Reno, Inc.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Holding, management, and investment of securities.</li> <li>2. Consulting regarding corporate management and finance.</li> <li>3. Any business incidental to each of the above items.</li> </ol>	Hironao Fukushima	3,484,900	8.83%
Aya Nomura	Individual		3,750,000	9.51%
Fuminori Nakashima	Individual		3,562,400	9.03%
Toshihide Suzuki	Individual		100,000	0.25%
Office Support Corporation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Investment.</li> <li>2. Investment, holding, rental, management, and purchase and sale of real estate, etc.</li> <li>3. Management consulting.</li> <li>4. Any business incidental to each of the above items.</li> </ol>	Tatsuya Ikeda	2,946,100	7.47%
Total			13,843,400	35.09%

(Table 2) Breakdown of Your Group's Recent Acquisition Funds Stated on Large-Volume Holdings Reports

Names of Submitter and Joint Holders	Number of Share Certificates, Etc., Held (Total number)	Holding Ratio	Own Funds (1,000 yen)	Borrowed Funds (1,000 yen)	Other Funds (1,000 yen)
Reno, Inc.	3,484,900	8.83%	8,214,266	0	0
Aya Nomura	3,750,000	9.51%	61,762	6,514,025	0
Fuminori Nakashima	3,562,400	9.03%	55,552	0	8,074,223
Toshihide Suzuki	100,000	0.25%	0	0	189,425
Office Support Corporation	2,946,100	7.47%	6,601,559	0	0
Total	13,843,400	35.09%	14,933,139	6,514,025	8,263,648

(Table 3) Past Joint Holders and Holding Ratios (Maximum Values)

Names of Submitter and Joint Holders	Nature of Business (In cases of juridical persons)	Representative	Number of Share Certificates, Etc., Held (Total number)	Holding Ratio	Submission Date of Pertinent Holdings Report
C&I Holdings Co., Ltd.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Collection and provision of information regarding businesses, products, and technologies.</li> <li>2. Publication of magazines and other printed matter.</li> <li>3. Planning, holding, and administration of workshops and seminars.</li> <li>4. Planning, holding, and administration of informal gatherings with domestic and foreign companies, exhibitions, etc.</li> <li>5. Agency recruitment and guidance of franchisees.</li> <li>6. Management consulting.</li> <li>7. Acquisition and holding of securities.</li> <li>8. Investment, holding, rental, management, and purchase and sale of real estate, etc.</li> <li>9. Money lending.</li> <li>10. Any business incidental to each of the above items.</li> </ol>	Tatsuya Ikeda	2,187,700	5.55%	May 20, 2016
Yoshiaki Murakami	Individual		3,673,600	9.31%	Nov. 16, 2015
Minami Aoyama Fudosan Co., Ltd.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Investment, holding, rental, management, and purchase and sale of real estate, etc.</li> <li>2. Investment.</li> <li>3. Management consulting.</li> <li>4. Any business incidental to each of the above items.</li> </ol>	Tatsuya Ikeda	1,076,100	2.73%	Nov. 9, 2016
City Index Maiko Co., Ltd.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Investment.</li> <li>2. Purchase and sale, rental, exchange, brokerage, management, and holding of real estate.</li> <li>3. Real estate consulting.</li> </ol>	Tatsuya Ikeda	2,271,400	5.95%	Mar. 9, 2015

	<p>4. Investment, management, purchase and sale, and holding of real estate and securities, and customer services concerning financial asset management.</p> <p>5. Provision of real estate information.</p> <p>6. Video content planning and production.</p> <p>7. Video content consulting.</p> <p>8. Personnel management regarding video content.</p> <p>9. Any business incidental to each of the above items.</p>				
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(Table 4) State of Large-Volume Holdings by Mr. Fuminori Nakashima since September 2016

Holdings Report Submission Date	Number of Share Certificates, Etc., Held (Total number)	Holding Ratio	Notes
Oct. 7, 2016	1,119,000	2.84%	
Nov. 9, 2016	1,521,700	3.86%	
Nov. 25, 2016	1,946,200	4.93%	
Dec. 9, 2016	2,351,300	5.96%	
Dec. 22, 2016	925,100	2.35%	Transferred to Office Support Corporation
Jan. 13, 2017	1,347,500	3.42%	
Feb. 3, 2017	1,765,700	4.48%	
Feb. 22, 2017	2,167,800	5.50%	
Mar. 7, 2017	2,606,400	6.61%	
Mar. 16, 2017	3,085,800	7.82%	
Mar. 29, 2017	3,562,400	9.03%	

(Table 5) Ms. Aya Nomura: Breakdown of Recent Acquisition Funds

		(Ratio)
Own Funds (1,000 yen)	61,762	0.94%
Borrowed Funds (1,000 yen)	6,514,025	99.06%
Other Funds (1,000 yen)	0	
Acquisition Funds Total (1,000 yen)	6,575,787	

(Table 6) Mr. Fuminori Nakashima: Breakdown of Recent Acquisition Funds

		(Ratio)
Own Funds (1,000 yen)	55,552	0.68%
Borrowed Funds (1,000 yen)	0	
Other Funds (1,000 yen)	8,074,223	99.32%
Breakdown of the Above	Margin trading: Matsui Securities 6,926,458 Okasan Online Securities 1,147,764	
Acquisition Funds Total (1,000 yen)	8,129,775	

(Table 7) Mr. Toshihide Suzuki: Breakdown of Recent Acquisition Funds

		(Ratio)
Own Funds (1,000 yen)	0	
Borrowed Funds (1,000 yen)	0	
Other Funds (1,000 yen)	189,425	100%
Breakdown of the Above	Margin trading: H.S. Securities 189,425	
Acquisition Funds Total (1,000 yen)	189,425	

## Appendix 2

( i ) Yoshiaki Murakami

Born in 1959

1983 Joined the Ministry of International Trade and Industry  
(currently the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry)

1999 Established M&A Consulting

( ii ) Hironao Fukushima

Born in 1959

1952 Joined ORIX Corporation

2008 Deputy Head, Risk Management Headquarters of ORIX Corporation

2013 Joined Reno, Inc. (to present)

( iii ) A lawyer specialized in M&A

A lawyer specialized in M&A would be selected for the purpose of promoting the M&A strategy hereafter.